Abstract. Anonymous Single-Sign-On authentication schemes have been proposed to allow users to access a service protected by a verifier without revealing their identity which has become more important due to the introduction of strong privacy regulations. In this paper we describe a new approach whereby anonymous authentication to different verifiers is achieved via authorisation tags and pseudonyms. The particular innovation of our scheme is authentication can only occur between a user and its designated verifier for a service, and the verification cannot be performed by any other verifier. The benefit of this authentication approach is that it prevents information leakage of a user's service access information, even if the verifiers for these services collude which each other. Our scheme also supports a trusted third party who is authorised to de-anonymise the user and reveal her whole services access information if required. Furthermore, our scheme is lightweight because it does not rely on attribute or policy-based signature schemes to enable access to multiple services. The scheme's security model is given together with a security proof, an implementation and a performance evaluation.
Introduction
Single-sign-on (SSO) systems are a user-friendly way of allowing users access to multiple services without requiring them to have different usernames or passwords for each service. SSO solutions (e.g. OpenID 2.0 [33] by the OpenID foundation or Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)'s Kerberos [31] ) are designed to make the users' identities and possibly additional personal identifiable information (PII) available to the verifiers of the services which they wish to access. However, for some services, a verifier may not require the user's identity (nor any associated PII), just that the user is authorised to access the desired service. Moreover, the introduction of more stringent obligations with regards to the handling of PII in various jurisdictions (e.g. GDPR in Europe [19] ), requires service providers to minimise the use of PII.
Anonymous single-sign-on schemes [18, 24, 36 ,27] exist which can protect a user's identity, but may not do so for all entities within a scheme. Moreover, a user's service request can be verified by all verifiers of a system rather than the one it is intended for which may pose a potential privacy risk to both the user and that verifier.
Our proposed scheme addresses these issues and provides the following features: (1) only one authentication ticket is issued to a user, even if she wants to access multiple distinct services; (2) a user can obtain a ticket from a ticket issuer anonymously without releasing anything about her personal identifiable information -in particular, the ticket issuer cannot determine whether two ticket requests are for the same user or two different users; (3) a designated verifier can determine whether a user is authorised to access its service but cannot link different service requests made by the same user nor collude with other verifiers to link a user's service requests; (4) designated verifiers can detect and prevent a user making multiple authentication requests using the same authentication tag ("double spend") but cannot de-anonymise the user as a result; (5) tickets cannot be forged; and (6) given a user's ticket, a central verifier is authorised to recover a user's identity as well as the identities of the verifiers for the requested services in the user's ticket.
Our contributions are: a novel, anonymous single-sign-on scheme providing the above features; its associated security model and security definitions; a corresponding formal proof of its security as well as an empirical performance analysis based on a Java-based implementation of our scheme.
Related Work
We now look at previous research which is most closely related to our scheme in the areas of: i) Anonymous Single-Sign-On protocols, ii) anonymous authentication schemes, iii) multi-coupon schemes and iv) designated verifiers signature schemes.
Anonymous Single-Sign-On schemes
One of the earliest anonymous single-sign-on system was proposed by Elmufti et al. [18] for the Global System for Mobile communication (GSM). In their system, a user generates a different one-time identity each time they would like to access a service and, having authenticated the user, a trusted third party will then authenticate this one-time identity to the service provider. Consequently, the user is anonymous to the service provider but, unlike in our scheme, not the trusted third party who authenticated the one-time identity.
In 2010, Han et al. [24] proposed a novel dynamic SSO system which uses a digital signature to guarantee both the unforgeability and the public verification of a user's credential. In order to protect the user's privacy, their scheme uses broadcast encryption which means that only the designated service providers can check the validity of the user's credential. Moreover, zero-knowledge proofs are used to show that the user is the owner of those valid credentials to prevent impersonation attacks. However, again unlike our scheme, the user is still known to the trusted third party which issued the credentials.
Wang et al. [36] , on the other hand, propose an anonymous SSO based on group signatures [3] . In order to access a service, the user generates a different signature-based pseudonyms from her credentials and sends the signature to the service provider. If the signature is valid, the service provider grants the user access to the service to the user; otherwise, the service request is denied. The real identities of users can be identified by using the opening technique in [3] . While the user remains anonymous, their scheme (unlike ours) does not, however, provide designated verifiers, i.e. all verifiers can validate a user's request.
Lastly, Lee[27] proposed an efficient anonymous SSO based on Chebyshev Chaotic Maps. In this scheme, an issuer, the "smart card processing center", issues secret keys to users and service providers when they join in the system and to access a service, a user and service provider establish a session key with their respective secret keys. If the session key is generated correctly, the service request is granted; otherwise, it is denied. However, unlike our scheme, each service provider knows the identity of the user accessing their service.
While in [24] , [36] and [27] , a user can access any service in the system by using her credentials, in our scheme, a user can only access the services which she selects when obtaining a ticket but can do so while remaining completely anonymous to both issuer and service provider.
Anonymous authentication schemes
With respect to anonymous authentication solutions, we consider schemes whose primary feature is to support multiple anonymous authentication. As in our scheme, anonymous authentication enables users to convince verifiers that they are authorised users without releasing their exact identities.
Teranishi et al.
[35] proposed a k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) scheme where the verifiers determine the number of anonymous authentication that can be performed. The k-TAA scheme provides the following two features: (1) no party can identify users who have been authenticated within k times; (2) any party can trace users who have been authenticated more than k times. The verifier generates k tags and for each authentication, a user selects a fresh tag. Nguyen et al.
[32] proposed a similar dynamic k-TAA scheme to restrict access to services not only the number of times but also other factors such as expiry date.
Camenisch et al. [9] proposed a periodic k-TAA scheme which enables users to authenticate themselves to the verifiers no more than k times in a given time period but supports reuse of the k times authentication once the period is up. In this scheme, the issuer decides the number of anonymous authentication request a user can make in a given time period. When a user makes an anonymous authentication request, he proves to a verifier that he has obtained a valid CL signature from the issuer.
Note, however, that our scheme also prevents a verifier from establishing whether a user has used any of the other services thereby also guaranteeing verifier anonymity.
Furthermore, in all of these k-TAA schemes [35,32,9], authentication is not bound to a particular verifier, whereas in our scheme authentication tags are bound to specific verifiers. Moreover, k-TAA schemes allow verifiers to determine a user's identity who has authenticated more than k times while in our scheme multiple authentications to a single verifier is considered "double spending" which a verifier can detect but which does not lead to the de-anonymisation of a user.
However, to prevent users from potentially abusing the system, our scheme allows for a central verifier who, given a user's ticket, can extract from it both the user's and verifiers' public keys using the authentication tags contained within it and thus establish the identities of both the user and her associated verifiers.
Lastly, Camenisch et al. in [12] and the IBM identity mixer description of its features in [37] define a scheme that has similar properties to ours including that of a central verifier (called "inspector") trusted to reveal a user's identity. The scheme is based on users obtaining a list of certified attributes from an issuer and the users using a subset of their attributes to authenticate to verifiers. The distinguishing difference between their scheme and ours is that their verification of anonymous credentials is not bound to a designated verifier whereas our is.
Multi-coupon schemes
There is some degree of similarity between our scheme and a number of multi-coupon schemes. Armknecht et al. [1] proposed a multi-coupon scheme for federated environments where multiple vendors exist. In [1] , a user can redeem multiple coupons anonymously with different vendors in an arbitrary order. To prevent double-spending of a coupon, a central database is required to record the transaction of each multi-coupon. The main difference to our scheme is that each coupon can be redeemed against any service provider while our authentication tags can only be validated by its designated verifier. Moreover, our "double-spend" detection is done by the verifier and does not require a central database.
Similarly, the schemes propose by Liu et al. [29] which provides strong user privacy and where a user can use an e-coupon anonymously no more than k times before his identity can be recovered. However, the user's coupons can be redeemed against any service rather than a designated verifier as our scheme provides.
Designated Verifiers
Jakobsson in [25] introduced the concept of a designated verifier which means that in a proof we ascertain that nobody but this verifier can be convinced by that proof while the authors in [20] present an anonymous attribute based scheme using designated-verifiers. In their work they focus on identifying multiple designated verifiers This is achieved through using the verifier's private key in the verification so that no other third party can validate the designated verifier signature. We adopt the high level concept of a designated verifier in our approach, i.e. given a valid authentication tag for service A, only service A's verifier can establish its validity. As this property is conceptually similar to the designated signatures described in [25, 20] , our verifiers are called designated verifiers. However, this is where the similarity ends with Jakobsson's designated verifiers. Notably, in [26], a verifier cannot convince others that the signature is from the signer because the verifier can generate the signature by himself. In our scheme, everyone can check that the authentication tags are signatures generated by the ticket issuer.
In summary, while a number of previous authentication schemes address the anonymity of the user and multiple authentications, the novelty of our work is that we ensure no information leakage across verifiers, since authentication can only occur between a user and its designated verifier while also providing a central verifier who can de-anonymise the user and reveal the identity of the verifiers in case of a misbehaving user. To the best of our knowledge, our anonymous singlesign-on scheme using designated verifiers is the first which has been formally presented in term of definitions, security models and proven to be secure under various cryptographic complexity assumptions together with an empirical performance evaluation.
Paper Organisation
This paper is organised as follows: Section ?? provides a high-level overview of the scheme and its claimed security properties; Section 3 outlines the applicable security model; Section 4 introduces the mathematical concepts and notation used throughout this paper; Section 5 describes the mathematical construction of our while Section 6 presents the theorems for its security proof; Section 7 provides a performance evaluation of our scheme; and Section 8 concludes the paper with directions for future work.
Scheme overview and security properties
Entities in our proposed scheme Before providing a high-level overview of our anonymous single-sign-on scheme, we first introduce the various entities in the scheme as shown in Figure 1 , and define their purpose and roles:
-Central Authority (CA): The CA is a trusted third party responsible for establishing the cryptographic keys and parameters used in the scheme and signing the public keys of the other entities in the scheme; 
Ticket
Trace: Fig. 1 . Interaction of the various entities in our scheme -User (U): Someone who wishes to access some distinct services anonymously; -Ticket Issuer (I): This entity issues tickets to registered, yet anonymous users for the requested services; -Designated Verifier (V): The V is a verifier for a specific service that a user might want to access; -Central Verifier (CV): CV is another trusted third party which is allowed to retrieve the identities of the user, U, and the verifiers, Vs, from the authentication tags present in a user's ticket, T U . -Authentication Tag (T ag V ): This tag is both tied to a user, U, and a designated verifier, V and is used to prove to the designated verifier that the user is a valid user and allowed to access the associated service; -Ticket (T U ): A ticket which contains the authentication tags for the services a user, U, has requested;
Overview of proposed scheme Figure 1 illustrates at a high-level how our scheme works. For the detailed mathematical construction of our scheme, please refer to Section 5. Conceptually, our scheme operates as follows:
-Registration: The issuer, verifiers, central verifier and users all register with the CA. -Ticket Issuing: A user decides which services(and thus which verifiers) she wants to access and requests an appropriate ticket from the issuer. -Tag Validation: To access a service, the user presents the appropriate authentication tag to the service. The validity period and any other restrictions of the tag can be captured in the free text part of the tag or be a default set by the verifier. If a user's tag is valid then the user is logged in to the service. Note that, unlike some other Single-Sign-On systems, the issuer does not need to be on-line for the tag validation to succeed. -"Double-Spend" detection: Should the user present the same tag twice then the verifier can warn the user that she is already logged in and should resume the already existing session or offer to terminate the previous session and continue with a fresh one.
-Ticket trace: If a user is seen to abuse the service (e.g. violate the terms and conditions), the central verifier might be called upon to de-anonymise the user and determine any other services she has used.
Security properties in our proposed scheme
Having defined the different entities and described how they interact, we now list the security properties of our scheme: -User Anonymity: In our scheme, users use pseudonyms whenever they interact with the issuer or a verifier. As such, the issuer cannot link a user across different ticket requests. Similarly, a user's identity is also hidden from a designated verifier. -Authentication Tag Unlinkability: Apart from the central verifier and the issuer, no set of colluding verifiers can establish whether two or more different authentication tags came from the same anonymous user. -Verifier Anonymity: The verifier's identify is protected from other users and verifiers, i.e.
given an authentication tag, only the designated verifier can validate it and no other verifier (apart from the central verifier and the issuer) can determine for whom it is. -Designated Verifiability: Given an authentication tag, T ag V for verifier, V, only V can validate it. -"Double-spend" detection: Any verifier, V, can detect when a user attempts to re-use an authentication tag but cannot de-anonymise the user. -Unforgeability: Neither tickets nor individual authentication tags can be forged by any colluding users or verifiers. -Traceability: There exists a trusted third party, a central verifier, who can, given a user's ticket, T U , retrieve the user's and the verifiers' public keys (and hence their respective identities) from the authentication tags contained within T U .
In the next section, we provide the security models in which these properties hold while Section 6 contains the associated theorems which are used to prove those models.
Security Model Overview
We now present a high-level overview of the security models which are used to prove the security of our scheme. The models are defined by the following games executed between a challenger and an adversary.
Unlinkability Game:
This game covers the security properties of user anonymity, authentication tag unlinkability, verifier anonymity, designated verifiability and "double spend" detection. In this game verifiers and other users can collude but cannot profile a user's whole service information. In other words, no party can link different tags to the same user and determine a verifier's identity included in an authentication tag (thus proving verifier anonymity) except for the designated verifier, the ticket issuer or the central verifier. Moreover, for each authentication tag, the adversary can query its validity once, which in the context of this game addresses the properties of designated verifiability and "double spending".
This game is formally defined in Appendix B.1. This game focuses on proving the unforgeability property of our scheme. Users, verifiers and the central verifier can collude but cannot forge a ticket on behalf of the ticket issuer.
This game is formally defined in Appendix B.2.
Traceability Game:
This game focuses on the traceability property of our scheme. It shows that even if users, verifiers and the central verifier collude, they cannot generate a ticket which is linked to a user who has never obtained a ticket or a user who is not the real owner of the ticket. This game is formally defined in Appendix B.3.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the mathematical concepts used by our scheme including bilinear groups, the BBS+ signature scheme, zero knowledge proofs and various complexity assumptions needed to ensure its security. The mathematical notation and symbols used throughout this paper are summarised in Table 1 .
Bilinear Groups and pairings
In our scheme, bilinear groups are used to support the BBS+ signature scheme (defined in Section 4.2 below). Let G 1 , G 2 and G τ be three cyclic groups with prime order p. A pairing is defined to be a bilinear, non-degenerative and computable map e : G 1 × G 2 → G τ [7] . Given a security parameter, 1 , we define BG(1 ) → (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) to be a bilinear group generation algorithm. Note that Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [21] classified parings into three basic types and our scheme is based on the Type-III pairing where the elements on G 1 are short (≈ 160 bits). This was chosen because for all g ∈ G 1 and g ∈ G 2 , there exists an polynomial-time efficient algorithm to compute e(g, g) ∈ G τ resulting in an more efficient algorithm.
BBS+ Signature
Based on the group signature scheme [6] , Au, Susilo and Mu [2] proposed the BBS+ signature. This signature scheme works as follows:
The secret-public key pair is (x, Y ).
-Signing: To sign a block message (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n ) ∈ Z n p , the signer selects w, e R ← Z p , and
Given a signature (w, e, σ) and (m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n ), the verifier checks e(Y h e , σ)
. If so, the signature is valid; otherwise, it is invalid.
Au, Susilo and Mu [2] reduced the security of the above signature to the q-SDH assumption (see Definition 2 below) in Type-II paring. Recently, Camenisch, Drijvers and Lehmann [8] reduced its security to the JOC-version-q-SDH assumption (see Definition 3 below) for Type-III pairing.
Zero-Knowledge Proof
In our scheme, zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocols are used to prove knowledge and statements about various discrete logarithms including: (1) proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm modulo a prime number [34]; (2) proof of knowledge of equality of representation [14] ; (3) proof of knowledge of a commitment related to the product of two other commitments [11] . We follow the definition introduced by Camenish and Stadler in [13] which was formalised by Camenish, Kiayias and Yung in [10] . By PoK:{(α, β, γ) : Υ = g α h β ∧Υ =g αhγ }, proof on knowledge of integers α β and γ such that Υ = g α h β andΥ =g αhβ hold on the groups G = g = h andG = g = h , respectively. The convention is that the letters in the parenthesis (α, β, γ) represent the knowledge which is being proven by using the other values which the verifier can have access to.
Complexity Assumptions
The security of our scheme relies on a number of complexity assumptions defined in this subsection.
Definition 1. (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption [23])
Let G be a cyclic group with prime order p and g be a generator of G. Given Y ∈ G, we say that the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption holds on G if for all adversary can output a number x ∈ Z p such that Y = g x with a negligible advantage, namely Adv
The DL assumption is used in the proof of the traceability property of our scheme.
Suppose that g and g are generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Given a (q + 2)-tuple (g, g x , g
× G 2 , we say that q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on (e, p,
where c ∈ Z p − {−x}.
, we say that the JOC-qstrong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p,
The security of the BBS+ signature used in our scheme relies on both the (q-SDH ) and JOCq-SDH) assumptions.
1 , we say that the decisional Deffie-Hellman assumption holds on (e, p,
Note that the DDH assumption is believed to be hard in both G 1 and G 2 for the Type-III pairing [22] used in our scheme which means that we actually makes use of the following stronger complexity assumption.
We say that the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) if the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds on both G 1 and G 2 .
Scheme construction
In this section, we present a more detailed description of the interactions (cf. Fig. 1 ) between the entities of our scheme. These interactions are: (i) System Initialisation, (ii) Registration, (iii) Ticket Issuing, (iv) Tag Verification and (v) Ticket Tracing. Moreover, we provide details of the mathematical constructs used in these interactions. Formal definitions of the algorithms presented in this section can be found in Appendix A.
System Set-up:CA runs BG(1 ) → (e, p, G1, G2, Gτ ) with e : G1×G2 → Gτ . Let g, h, ξ,h be generators of the group G1 and g be generators of G2. Suppose that H1 : {0, 1} * → Zp and H2 : {0, 1} * → Zp are two cryptographic hash functions. CA selects xa R ← Zp and computes YA = g xa . The master secret key is M SK = xa and the public parameters are P P = (e, p, G1, G2, Gτ , g, h, ξ,h, g, YA, H1, H2). Fig. 2 shows the details of the system initialisation in which the central authority CA generates a master secret key, M SK, and the required public parameters, P P .
Fig. 2. System Set-up Algorithm

System Initialisation
Note: Once the system has been set up, all communication between the different entities in our scheme is assumed to be over secure, encrypted channels which can be established by the various entities using standard Public Key Infrastructure. This ensures that our scheme is not susceptible to simple Man-In-The-Middle attacks. Fig. 3 depicts the registration processes. When registering with the CA, I, V, U and CV use the P P and generate their own secret-public key pairs. They then send their identities and associated public keys to CA which, after receiving a registration request from an entity, uses M SK to generate the corresponding credential for them. Note that only the ticket issuer has two public keys, Y I andỸ I . The first one is used to sign the tickets while the second one is used to validate the ticket.
Registration
Ticket Issuing
During the ticket issuing process (shown in Fig. 4 ), the user U defines J U to be the set containing the identities of the ticket verifiers whose services she wants to access as well as the identity of the central verifier. In order to request a ticket from I, U creates pseudonyms, P V and Q V , for each ID V ∈ J U by using her secret key to protect the anonymity of the verifiers. She also produces a proof of knowledge of her credentials and submits this proof together with the set J U and the pseudonyms to I to convince him that she is a registered user and created the pseudonyms. Once I has received this information and verified the proof of knowledge, he generates an authentication tag T ag V for each ID V ∈ J U as well as an overall T ag CV for CV in case the ticket needs to be traced. Note that these tags are constructed using the public keys of the respective verifiers and thus can only be validated by the corresponding V or the central verifier, CV. The ticket is formed from these individual tags. Note that each tag and the overall ticket are signed by the issuer using his private key while the integrity of the tags and the overall ticket is assured using hashes of their respective content. The ticket is sent back to U who verifies the integrity of each tag and the overall ticket using the supplied hash values as well as that each tag and the overall ticket have been signed by the issuer.
Tag Verification
The tag verification process is shown in Fig. 5 . When the user U wants to access a service, the tag verifier V send his identity information to the user which U uses to look up the corresponding tag, The secret-public key pair is (xi, YI ,ỸI ). T ag V . In order to access the service, U must submit a proof of knowledge of her secret key alongside the relevant authentication tag T ag V to prevent users from sharing authentication tags. V checks his table of previously received tags to ensure that the tag has not already been used previously (double-spend detection), before verifying the user's proof of knowledge in Step 1.
Step 2 checks the integrity of the tag using a hash function while Step 4 verifies that it has been issued by the ticket issuer, I.
Step 3 can only be verified by V as it requires the private key of the verifier. Only if V can complete all steps successfully, is the user granted access.
Ticket-Issuing
Let JU is U's list of the identities of verifiers which U wants to access as well as IDCV
PoK{(xu, ru, eu, σU , v1, v2, v3, v, Selects tu R ← Zp, and computes CU = ξ tu .
For IDV ∈ JU , selects dv, wv, ev
and ZV = (gh wvhsv ) = H1(s1||s2|| · · · ||s |J U | ) and e(ZCV ,ỸI g ecv ) = e(gh wcvhscv , g) c) Keep (zu, CU ) secret a T ext consists of the system version information and all other information which can be used by verifiers to validate the tag, e.g. valid period, tag type, etc.
Fig. 4. Ticket Issuing Algorithm
Ticket Tracing
Lastly, in the case that a user U's whole service information J U needs to be traced, the central verifier, CV, sends its identity to U who is then required to submit the information needed by the Ticket Validation algorithm as well as her overall ticket. Note that, provided a single tag is known, the whole ticket information could also be obtained directly from the issuer, I, in case the user is not co-operating.
Tag-Verification
User: U Tag verifier: V (IDV ∈ JU )
Computes DV = H2(CU ||IDV )
Initialize a table TV if none exists already. and searches (DV , T agV ). Computes zv = H1(zu||IDV ) and the proof:
(ev, wv, sv, ZV ) in TV and checks:
(1) The correctness of (2), (3) and (4) hold, the tag is valid; otherwise, it is invalid.
Fig. 5. Tag Verification Algorithm
On receipt of this information, the central verifier first validates that the submitted tag T ag CV passes the standard verification process (see Section5.4) as the central verifier's ID CV is always included in J U . As discussed previously, this steps ensures that U is a valid user and that the tag belongs to her. Once this steps has passed, the central verifier can then validate the integrity of the ticket and that the previously presented authentication tag is indeed part of the ticket which establishes that the ticket does indeed belong to user who presented it. Using his private key, the central verifier can now compute the user U's public key as well as the public keys of all the verifiers contained within the authentication tags and thus determine the user's identity and her service information J U .
Security Analysis
In this section we present the theorems which establish the security of our scheme.
Theorem 1 (Unlinkability). An anonymous Single-Sign-On for n designated services with traceability scheme in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 is (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 , ( ) )-selectively unlinkable if the DDH assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) with the advantage at most ( ), and H 1 , H 2 are secure cryptographic hash functions, where 1 is the total number of verifiers selected by A to query tickets, 2 is the number of ticket validation queries, 3 is the number of ticket trace queries, ( ) =
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from the unlinkability game in Appendix B.1 and is formally proved in Appendix F.
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability). An anonymous Single-Sign-On for n designated services with traceability scheme in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 is ( , ( )) -unforgeable if the JOC-version-q-SDH assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) with the advantage = e(gh wvhsv , g). If (1), (2), (3) and (4) hold, the tag is valid; otherwise abort as it is invalid. Finally, de-anonymise the user and her services by:
(ii) Look up IDV for YV 's. Check: = e(gh wcvhscv , g). Provided (5), (6) and (7) can be computed, CV can determine that the service information of U with public key YU is: JU = ΩU ; otherwise, the trace has failed.
Fig. 6. Ticket Trace Algorithm
at most ( ), and H 1 , H 2 are secure cryptographic hash functions, where is the total number of verifiers selected by A to query tickets, ≤ q, ( ) = (
Theorem 2 is demonstrated by the unforgeability game in Appendix B.2 and it is formally proved in Appendix G.
Theorem 3 (Traceability).
An anonymous Single-Sign-On for n designated services with traceability scheme in Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 is (ρ, ( ) )-traceable if the q-SDH assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) with the advantage at most 1 ( ), the DL assumption holds on the group G 1 with the advantage at most 2 ( ), and H 1 , H 2 are secure cryp-tographic hash functions, where ( ) = max
, is the total number of ticket issuing queries made by A and < q.
Theorem 3 follows from the traceability game in Appendix B.3 and its formal proof is given in Appendix H.
Benchmarking results
Our proposed scheme has been implemented ([16]) on a Dell Inspiron Latitude E5270 laptop with an Intel Core i7-6600U CPU, 1TB SSD and 16GB of RAM running Fedora 27.
The implementation makes use of bilinear pairings using elliptic curves as well as other cryptographic primitives. As such the implementation of the scheme relies on the JPBC library ( [15] ) for the bilinear pairings and uses the cryptographic functions provided by bouncycastle ([28]). Table 2 shows the results of the computational time spent in the various phases of our proposed scheme which required more complex computations (i.e. some form of verification or generation of proofs) . Note that the Java based implementation of the JPBC API ( [15] ) was used throughout.
Timings
The bilinear mapping used in the protocol implementations was a Type F elliptic curve where G is the group of points of the elliptic curve and |G| = p is its prime order whose binary representation requires r-bits.
The creation of credentials by the CA for the issuer, user and the (central) verifiers during the registration phase of the protocol is on average around 12ms for r = 160 bits and 30ms for r = 320 bits while the verification of those credentials by the various parties takes about 300ms and 650ms for 160 bits and 320 bits respectively.
It can be seen from Table 2 that the current implementation of the our scheme is reasonably fast for elliptic curves where r = 160 (e.g. ≈ 1.5s and ≈ 250ms for ticket issuing and verification respectively) and still acceptable for r = 320 bits (≈ 4s and ≈ 600ms for the same steps).
Moreover, it should be possible to improve the performance of the code by switching from the current Java-based version to using a Java-wrapper to the C-based implementation of the pbc libraries ([30]), instead.
Conclusion and Future Work
Previous Anonymous Single-Sign-On schemes usually protect the user's identity from other verifiers but not always the issuer nor the verifier to whom the user needs to authenticate. However, previously, the identity of these verifiers has not been considered extensively and neither has the need to ensure that only a designated verifier can validate a given access request. In this paper we proposed an Anonymous Single-Sign-On scheme which enables users and verifiers to remain anonymous throughout while protecting the system from misbehaving users through a central verifier who can, if required, trace the identities of a user and her associated verifiers. Moreover, we provided a formal security model and proofs for the security properties of our scheme as well as an implementation demonstrating the feasibility of deployment. In our scheme, a user can currently only authenticate to a verifier once as there is only one authentication tag for each verifier in a user's ticket. If the user needs to authenticate herself to a verifier, V, multiple times, she must request additional tickets with the required authentication tag for V from the issuer. Our scheme could alternatively be amended to allow multiple authentication tags per verifier in each ticket. In this case the scheme's security model and proofs would need to be amended to support this.
Anonymous Single-Sign-On was the main motivational use case for our scheme, but there are other scenarios to which the could be applied, e.g. the purchase of tickets for tourist attractions, where being able to issue a ticket through an Android implementation would be appropriate. Initial results however demonstrate that the timings on an Android client are significantly slower, for example ticket validation can take ≈ 200 times longer than on the laptop. Future work will focus on improving the scheme's performance further (especially on the Android platform) by moving from a pure Java-based implementation to a C-based version.
Lastly, extending our scheme with an option for users to enable the controlled release of personal information to a given verifier, e.g. by letting a user control which verifier is allowed to deanonymise her authentication tag, is another area of future research. 
A Formal Definition
The definition of our scheme is formalised by the following five algorithms:
1. Setup (1 ) → (M SK, P P ) . CA inputs a security parameter 1 , and outputs the master secret key M SK and the public parameters P P .
Registration: This algorithm consists of the following four sub-algorithms:
-Ticket-Issuer-Registration (I(ID I , SK I , P K I , P P ) ↔ CA(M SK, P K I , P P )) → (σ I , (ID I , P K I )). This is an interactive algorithm executed between CA and I. I runs the secret-public key pair generation algorithm KG(1 ) → (SK I , P K I ), inputs its identity ID I , secret-public key pair (SK I , P K I ) and the public parameters P P , and outputs a credential σ I . CA inputs the master secret key M SK, I's public key P K I and the public parameters P P , and outputs the identity ID I and the public key P K I .
. This is an interactive algorithm executed between CA and V. V runs KG(1 ) → (SK V , P K V ), inputs its identity ID V , secret-public key pair (SK V , P K V ) and the public parameters P P , and outputs a credential σ V . CA inputs the master secret key M SK, V's public key P K V and the public parameters P P , and outputs the identity ID V and the public key P K V .
This is an interactive algorithm executed between CA and U. U runs KG(1 ) → (SK U , P K U ), inputs its identity ID U , secret-public key pair (SK U , P K U ) and the public parameters P P , and outputs a credential σ U . CA inputs the master secret key M SK, U's public key P K U and the public parameters P P , and outputs the identity ID U and the public key P K U .
-Central-Verifier-Registration (P(ID CV , SK CV , P K CV , P P ) ↔ CA(M SK, P K CV , P P )) → (σ CV , (ID CV , P K CV )). This is an interactive algorithm executed between CA and CV. CV runs KG(1 ) → (SK CV , P K CV ), inputs its identity ID CV , secret-public key pair (SK CV , P K CV ) and the public parameters P P , and outputs a credential σ CV . CA inputs the master secret key M SK, CV's public key P K CV and the public parameters P P , and outputs the identity ID CV and the public key P K CV .
3. Ticket-Issuing (U(SK U , P K U , J U , σ U , P P ) ↔ I(SK I , P K I , P P )) → (T U , J U ). This is an interactive algorithm executed between U and I. U takes as input his secret-public key pair (SK U , P K U ), his service information J U consisting of the identities of ticket verifiers, his credential σ U and the public parameters P P , and outputs a ticket T U = T ag CV ∪ {T ag V |V ∈ J U } where the authentication tags T ag V and T ag CV can only be validated by the verifier V with V ∈ J U and the central verifier CV, respectively. I takes as input his secret-public key pair (SK I , P K I ) and the public parameters P P , and outputs the service information J U .
. This is an interactive algorithm executed between U and V with V ∈ J U . U takes as input his secret-public key pair (SK U , P K U ), the authentication tag T ag V and the public parameters P P , and outputs ⊥. V takes input his secret-public key pair (SK V , P K V ), I's public key P K S and the public parameters P P , and outputs (1, T ag V ) if V ∈ J U and the authentication tag T ag V is valid; otherwise, it outputs (0, T ag V ) to indicate an invalid tag.
5. Ticket-Trace (SK CV , P K CV , T ag CV , T U , P P )) → (U, J U ). CV takes as inputs his secret-public key pair (SK CV , P K CV ), the authentication token T ag CV , the ticket T U and the public parameters P P , and outputs U and U's whole service set J U .
Definition 6. An anonymous single-sign-on for n designated services with traceability is correct if
B Security Model
The security model of our scheme is defined by the following three games executed between an adversary A and a challenger C.
B.1 Unlinkability Game
This game is used to define the unlinkability, i.e. even if some ticket verifiers collude with potential users, they cannot profile the whole service information of other users. We assume that S and P cannot be compromised because they can know a user's whole service information by themselves. This game is formalized as follows:
Setup. C runs Setup(1 ) → (M SK, P P ) and sends P P to A.
Phase 1.
A can make the following queries.
Registration Query. A adaptively makes the following registration queries.
1. Ticket Issuer Registration Query. C runs KG(1 ) → (SK I , P K I ) and Ticket-Issuer-Registration (I(ID I , SK I , P K I , P P ) ↔ CA(M SK, P K S , P P )) → (σ I , (ID I , P K I )), and sends (P K I , σ I ) to A.
2. Ticket Verifier Registration Query. Let Corrupt V be the set consisting of the identities of verifiers corrupted by A. A can adaptively submit a verifier' identity
, and sends (P K V , σ V ) to A.
User Registration Query.
A can adaptively submit a user's identity ID U and runs
Ticket Issuing Query. A adaptively submits a set of service information J U to C. C runs TicketIssuing(U(SK U , P K U , J U , σ U , P P ) ↔ I(SK I , P K I , σ I , P P )) → (T U , J U ). Let QI be the set which consists of the ticket information queried by A and initially empty. C adds (T U , J U ) into QI and sends T U to A.
Ticket Validation Query. C initializes a table T V . A can adaptively submit an authentication tag T ag V to C. If T ag V ∈ T V , C aborts; otherwise, C adds T ag V into T V and works as follows. C runs Ticket-Validating(U(SK U , P K U , T ag V , P P ) ↔ V(SK V , P K V , P K I , P P )) → (⊥, (1, T ag V )/ (0, T ag V )) and returns (1, T ag V ) to A if T ag V is valid and V ∈ J U ; otherwise, (0, T ag V ) is returned to indicate V / ∈ J U . Let QV be the set which consists of the ticket validation queried by A and initially empty. C adds (T U , J U ) into QV .
Ticket Trace Query. A can adaptively submit a ticket T U . C runs Ticket-Trace(U(T U ) ↔ CV(SK CV , P K CV , T U , P P )) → (⊥, J U ), and returns J U to A if T U ∈ QI. Let QT be the set which consists of the ticket trace information queried by A and initially empty. C adds (T U , J U ) into QT . Definition 7. An anonymous single-sign-on for n designated services with traceability scheme is ( 1 , 2 , 3 , ( )) user secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A making at moset 1 ticket issuing queries, 2 ticket validation queries and 3 ticket trace queries can win the above game with negligible advantage, namely
We say that a scheme is selectively unlinkable if an initialization phase Initialization is added before the the Setup phase.
B.2 Unforgeability Game
This game is used to define the unforgeability of tickets, namely even if users, verifiers and the central verifier collude, they cannot forge a valid ticket. This game is formalized as follows:
Registration Query. A can make the following queries.
1. Ticket Seller Registration Query. C runs KG(1 ) → (SK I , P K I ) and Ticket-Seller-Registration (I(ID I , SK I , P K I , P P ) ↔ CA(M SK, P K I , P P )) → (σ I , (ID I , P K I )), and sends (P K I , σ I ) to A.
Ticket Verifier Registration Query.
A submits an identity ID V and runs
3. User Registration Query. A submits an identity ID U and runs
4. Central Verifier Registration Query. A submits a central verifier's identity ID CV and runs KG(1 ) → (SK CV , P K CV ). A and C run Central-Verifier-Registration (CV(ID CV , SK CV , P K CV , P P ) ↔ CA(M SK, P K CV , P P )) → (σ CV , (ID CV , P K CV )). C sends σ CV to A Ticket Issuing Query. A adaptively submits a set of service information J U . C runs Ticket-Issuing U (SK U , P K U , J U , σ U , P P ) ↔ I(SK I , P K I , σ I , P P ) → (T U , J U ) and sends T U to A. Let QI be the set which consists of the ticket information queried by A and initially empty. C adds (T U , J U ) into QI.
Output. A outputs a ticket T U * = {T ag V * |V * ∈ J U * } ∪ {T ag CV } for a user U * with a set of service information J U * . A wins the game if Ticket-
Definition 8. An anonymous single-sign-on for n designated services with traceability is ( , ( )) ticket-seller secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries A who make ticket issuing queries can only win the above game with negligible advantage, namely
B.3 Traceability Game
This game is used to formalize the traceability of tickets, namely even if a group of users collude, they cannot generate a ticket which the Ticket Trace algorithm would not catch as belonging to some member of the colluding group. We suppose that the ticket issuer is honest. This game is formalized as follows.
1. Ticket Issuer Registration Query. C runs KG(1 ) → (SK S , P K S ) and Ticket-Issuer-Registration (I(ID I , SK I , P K I , P P ) ↔ CA(M SK, P K S , P P )) → (σ I , (ID I , P K I )), and sends (P K I , σ I ) to A.
Ticket Verifier Registration Query.
A selects an verifier V and runs
3. User Registration Query. A selects an identity ID U and runs
C sends σ U to A. Let QK U be the set which consists of the users' identities selected by A to make registration query and is initially empty.
Ticket Issuing Query. A adaptively submits a set of service information J U . C runs Ticket-Issuing U (SK U , P K U , J U , σ U , P P ) ↔ I(SK I , P K I , σ I , P P ) → (T U , J U ) and sends T U to A. Let QI be the set which consists of the ticket information queried by A and initially empty. C adds (T U , J U ) into QI.
Output. A outputs a ticket T U * = {T ag V * |V * ∈ J U * } ∪ {T ag * CV } for a user U * with a set of service information J U * . A wins the game if Ticket-Trace ((SK CV , P K CV , T ag * CV , T *
Definition 9. An anonymous single-sign-on for n designated services with traceability scheme is ( , ( )) traceable if for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries A who make ticket issuing queries can only win the above game with negligible advantage, namely
An instantiation of the proof 2 U is as follows. U selects x u , z v R ← Z p , and computes
E Correctness
Our scheme is correct as the following equations hold.
and 
3. User Registration Query. Let RQ U be the set consisting of the registration information of users.
A selects an identity ID U and sends (ID U , Y U ) to B. B selects λ u , r u R ← Z p , and computes
A can adaptively make this registration queries multiple times. Ticket Issuing Query. A submits an identity ID U ∈ QR U , a set of service information J U , a set of pseudonym P s U = {(P V , Q V ) V ∈J U )}, and a proof PoK{(x u , r u , e u , σ
If the proof is incorrect, B aborts. Otherwise, B works as follows.
For
← Z p and computes
B select w cv , e cv R ← Z p , and computes s cv = H 1 (s 1 ||s 2 || · · · ||s |J U | ) and
Let QI be the set consisting of the tickets queried by A and is initially empty.
aborts; otherwise, B adds T ag V into T V and works as follows. B checks whether (
= e(gh wvhsv , g). If the above equations hold. B returns ID V to A; otherwise, ⊥ is returned to indicate failure. Let QV be the set consisting of ticket validation queries made by A and initially empty.
A can adaptively make this query up to ρ 2 times.
Ticket Trace Query. A submits a ticket T U . B works as follows. (1) Let
= e(gh wvhsv , g); = e(gh wcvhscv , g). If (1), (2) and (3) hold, CV can determine that the service information of U with public key Y U is: J U = Ω U ; otherwise, the trace has failed. Let QT be a set consisting of the ticket trace queries made by A. B adds T U into QT .
Phase 2. It is the same as in Phase 1 with the limitations:
3) A can adaptively make the ticket issuing query, ticket validation query and ticket trace query at most 1 , 2 and 3 , respectively. . Therefore, the advantage with which B can break the DDH assumption is
G Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. If there exists an adversary A which can break the unforgeability of our scheme with the advantage ( ), we can constructs an algorithm B which can use A as a subroutine to break the JOC-q-SDH assumption as follows. Given a (q + 3)-tuple (g, g x , · · · , g
Setup. B selects e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e q−1 R ← Z p , and sets
Registration Query. A can make the following queries. Ticket Issuing Query. A can adaptively submit a set of service information J U , a set of pseudonyms
If the verification is unsuccessful, B aborts; otherwise, B works as follows.
We claim that (w v , e v , Z V ) is a valid signature on s v . We have βc k k(wcv +ϑscv ) a . According to Equation (1), (w cv , e cv , Z CV ) is a BBS+ signature on s cv . If the q-th signature is required, B computes w cv = a − ϑs u and Z CV =g k . We claim that (w cv , e, Z CV ) is valid signature on s cv . Because, we have The ticket is T U = (D V , T ag V )|V ∈ J U ∪ s cv , w cv , e cv , Z CV . B sends (C U , T U , T ext) to A. Let QT be the set consisting of the tickets queried by A and is initially empty. B adds (T U , C U ) into QT . A can make this query adaptively at most ≤ q times.
Output: A outputs a ticket T U * = (D V * , P V * , Q V * , E V * , F V * , K V * , s v * , w v * , e v * , Z V * , T ext)|V * ∈ J U * ∪ (s cv , w cv , e cv , Z CV ) . Let (s * , w * , e * , Z * ) ∈ (s v * , w v * , e v * , Z V * |V * ∈ J U * ∪ (s cv , w cv , e cv , Z CV ) be a forged authentication tag.
We consider the following three cases. -Case-II. e * ∈ {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e q−1 , e}. We have e * = e with the probability Registration Query. A can make the following queries. = e(σ U , g). If the verification is unsuccessful, B aborts; otherwise, B generates a ticket T U = (D V , T ag V )|V ∈ J U ∪ s cv , w cv , e cv , Z CV by using the technique gaven in the proof of Theorem 1, and sends T U to A. Let QT be the set consisting of the tickets queried by A and is initially empty. B adds (T U , C U ) into QT . A can make this query adaptively at most ≤ q times.
Output: A outputs a ticket T U * = (D V * , P V * , Q V * , E V * , F V * , K V * , s v * , w v * , e v * , Z V * , T ext)|V * ∈ J U * ∪ (s cv , w cv , e cv , Z CV ) . If more than one users' pubic keys are included in the ticket T U * , the ticket is not generated correctly and B aborts. If B does not abort, the following two types of forgers are considered. Type-I forgers outputs a ticket T * U which includes at least a new pseudonym (P V , Q V ) which is not included in any ticket queried by A. Type-II forger outputs a ticket T * U which includes the same pseudonyms included in a ticket T U ∈ QT queried by A, but can be trace to a user U whose secrete key x is not known by A. Let (x , Y ) be the secret-public key pair of U .
